Data Connectivity Proxy security¶
This page describes how Data Connectivity Proxy (DCP) authenticates agents, manages certificates, and encrypts data-path traffic, and how you revoke access.
Authentication and certificate management¶
DCP uses a two-phase authentication model:
- Phase 1: Bootstrap
The agent reads the bootstrap JWT (minted with
SYSTEM$GENERATE_DATA_CONNECTIVITY_PROXY_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN) from the credentials file. It presents this JWT to the control plane and receives an mTLS certificate pair scoped to its DCP client identity.- Phase 2: Ongoing operation
The agent’s control sessions with the relay use mutual TLS (mTLS): the agent presents its client certificate and verifies the relay’s certificate. Data tunnels authenticate with a key established during the control session instead of exchanging certificates. Each data tunnel also performs its own key exchange.
Control plane traffic (heartbeats, routing table and policy updates, and certificate rotation) goes to the
dcp.hostname over TLS that authenticates the server only. The agent doesn’t present a client certificate on this connection. After bootstrap, the agent authenticates each control plane request with a short-lived JWT. The agent signs that JWT with the private key that matches the leaf certificate the control plane issued at bootstrap. The agent sends the bootstrap JWT again when it rotates that certificate, and if it bootstraps again after a control plane reconnect.By default, the outer TLS connection to the
dcp-proxy-fallbackrelay hostname doesn’t use a client certificate. The relay control session still uses mTLS inside that connection, and data tunnels remain encrypted end to end (see Data path security).
Certificate hierarchy¶
The agent validates relay mTLS certificates against a Snowflake-managed CA bundle delivered during bootstrap, not the operating system
trust store. Connections to the control plane, the dcp-proxy-fallback hostname, and the telemetry endpoint use publicly trusted
certificates and are verified against the container’s trust store. The Snowflake-managed bundle implements a four-tier PKI hierarchy:
The deployment root public key is pinned on first bootstrap. Any subsequent update that presents a different root is rejected. You don’t need to install or trust any Snowflake certificates in the OS or JVM trust store.
Snowflake periodically directs the agent to rotate its leaf certificate. The agent re-reads the credentials file, re-authenticates with the control plane, and receives a fresh certificate. Rotation is transparent to active connections.
Revoking access¶
To immediately revoke an agent’s ability to connect:
Or drop the object entirely:
After the DCP object is disabled or dropped, the control plane rejects the agent, and the relay no longer accepts the agent’s client certificate for its control session, regardless of the certificate’s cryptographic validity.
If the bootstrap JWT is compromised before bootstrap completes, regenerate the token:
Write the new token to the credentials file as described in Rotate the bootstrap token without downtime.
Network policy enforcement¶
A network policy on the DCP object is optional. Use one only if you want a DCP-specific policy that restricts which source IPs can connect to the DCP control plane:
For more information about creating network policies, see Controlling network traffic with network policies.
Data path security¶
All traffic between the agent and the Snowflake relay is encrypted using AES-256-GCM. Each data tunnel uses a separate P-256 ECDH key exchange, authenticated with a key from its relay control session.
The agent is a TCP-level pass-through. It doesn’t inspect, parse, buffer, or store the data passing through its tunnels. Source credentials remain in Snowflake and are never transmitted to the agent.
Corporate proxy support¶
The agent can send its outbound traffic through an HTTP proxy server that supports the CONNECT method. For setup steps, see
Route the agent through a corporate proxy.
By default, the proxy only relays TCP. The agent establishes TLS end to end with Snowflake through the proxy, so the proxy can’t read DCP traffic.
TLS inspection¶
If your security policy requires it, the proxy can decrypt and inspect some DCP traffic. Whether a connection can be inspected depends on the path the agent uses:
| Destination | Can be inspected | What an inspecting proxy can see |
|---|---|---|
dcp.<org>-<account>.<region>.<cloud>.snowflake.com (control plane) | Yes | Control plane messages. This includes the bootstrap token whenever the agent bootstraps, including certificate rotation, a short-lived token on later requests, and routing and policy updates. |
dcp-proxy-fallback.<org>-<account>.<region>.<cloud>.snowflake.com (relay) | Yes | The Host and x-snowflake-session relay-routing headers of each CONNECT request. The private destination and tunnel
contents stay encrypted (see Data path security). |
| Relay public IP addresses (direct path) | No | The corporate proxy sees the relay public IP address in the CONNECT request, but can’t decrypt the relay control
session or data tunnels. The control session uses mTLS, which a TLS-inspecting proxy can’t forward. Use fallback-only on
networks that inspect this path. |
<org>-<account>.telemetry.<locator>.snowflakecomputing.com (telemetry) | Yes | Agent metrics, logs, and traces, and the bearer token that authenticates them. |
The agent accepts the proxy’s certificate only if the proxy’s CA is in the container’s trust store. The agent never skips certificate verification.
Because an inspecting proxy can read the bootstrap token, the short-lived control plane token, and the telemetry bearer token when telemetry uses the proxy, restrict access to the proxy’s decrypted traffic and logs as you would any credential. If your policy allows it, exempt the control plane hostname from inspection.